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This experimental study is concerned with the impact of the timing of the resolution of risk on 
people’s willingness to take risks, with a special focus on the role of affect. While the 
importance of anticipatory emotions has so far been only inferred from decisions regarding 
hypothetical choice problems, we had participants put their own money at risk in a real 
investment task. Moreover, emotions were explicitly measured, including anticipatory 
emotions experienced during the waiting period under delayed resolution (which involved 
two days). Affective traits and risk attitudes were measured through a web-based 
questionnaire before the experiment and participants’ preferences for resolution timing, risk, 
and time were incentive compatibly measured during the experiment. Main findings are that 
delayed resolution can affect investment, that the effect depends on the risk involved, and that 
(among all the measures considered) only emotions can explain our results, albeit in ways that 
are not captured by existing models. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Decision making under risk often involves a time dimension, in the sense that some time passes 
between the decision to take the risk and the resolution of that risk. Examples are decisions 
concerning investment, medical examinations, lotteries, stock options versus compensations in 
cash, and health or safety related activities. The time that elapses before resolution can be very 
short, as with on-the-spot lotteries, but it can also be very long, like in research for new drugs. In 
mainstream economics this time dimension does not play a part, except for planning reasons, 
because the knowledge of outcomes may facilitate consumption smoothing (Drèze and Modigliani, 
1972; Spence and Zeckhauser, 1972).
1 However, there is a small but growing literature 
acknowledging that the timing of the resolution of risk can be important. A path-breaking 
theoretical study is Kreps and Porteus (1978) which formalizes preferences for early or later 
resolution. More recently, economists have begun to emphasize and to explore the role of 
anticipatory emotions in this context (see Loewenstein et al., 2001). For example, the arousal felt 
when looking at a spinning roulette wheel may add to the attractiveness of a gamble with delayed 
resolution. On the other hand, anxiety can cause people to prefer a larger immediate electric shock 
to a lesser shock that would be delayed (Cook and Barnes, 1964; Loewenstein, 1987). Some long-
lasting uncertainties can even cause stress and anxiety that is not only unpleasant but even health-
threatening (Lazarus, 1991). 
Emotions have received some attention in the economic literature. However this attention 
was typically restricted to experienced emotions when outcomes are observed, particularly regret 
and disappointment (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1986). Given the 
consequentialist character of mainstream economic models, this was a natural focus. Moreover, 
allowing for anticipatory emotions stands in the way of maintaining the axiom of temporal 
consistency (as in the model of Kreps and Porteus), as the influence of anticipatory emotions might 
change (reverse) an individual's preferences when the time of resolution draws near. Recently, 
supported by substantial psychological and neuroscientific evidence (see, e.g., Chua et al., 1999; 
Critchley et al., 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Wray and Stone, 2005), some economists have 
picked up the challenge to develop new models incorporating anticipatory emotions, focusing on 
anxiety (Wu, 1999; Caplin and Leahy, 2001). With these models, which will be discussed in greater 
                                                 
1 For a critical discussion of the neglect in economics of  different stages of decision making, see Pope (1985, 1995). INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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detail below, a novel perspective is offered on issues like the equity premium puzzle and the 
simultaneous occurrence of insurance and gambling. 
However, what seems equally important in expanding our understanding of the impact of 
anticipatory emotions on decisions under risk, is the development of a rich set of experimental data. 
Experiments enable us not only to test theoretical hypotheses and predictions but also to explore the 
role of different (anticipated and experienced) emotions and how these are affected by the delayed 
resolution of risk. In this way, they can assist in testing and improving theoretical models. 
Moreover, by a systematic and gradually more complicated experimental approach fundamental 
knowledge may be gained about the typically more complex and dynamic emotional patterns 
occurring in the field.
2 A few earlier studies should be mentioned in this context. Chew and Ho 
(1994) investigated participants’ resolution preference in an experimental study using different 
hypothetical contexts (scenarios). They found that enjoyment of delayed resolution (interpreted as 
hope) was more prevalent in case of a small probability of winning a large gain. Ahlbrecht and 
Weber (1997) – also using hypothetical contexts – found a general preference for early resolution, 
paired with a switching preference for late (early) resolution if the probability of winning (losing) is 
very small, which is interpreted as hope (fear). Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) asked participants 
about the attractiveness of different gambles and the acceptability of a delayed resolution of the risk 
involved (for an imaginary situation). They found that generally early resolution is preferred (for 
reasons other than planning), particularly for mixed gambles, which were also typically evaluated 
as unattractive. The interpretation is that people want to avoid dread and fear. To our knowledge 
there exist only two experimental studies using real monetary incentives. Noussair and Wu (2006), 
using the protocol of Holt and Laury (2002), found more risk-aversion for gambles resolved (and 
paid) in the present than in the future. Eliaz and Schotter (2007), eliciting willingness to pay for 
earlier resolution of risk, found some weak statistical evidence in support of the importance of 
earlier resolution, which is seen as favoring the hypothesis that anticipatory emotions may play a 
role.
3 We will return to these studies below. 
  The experimental study presented in this paper builds on this strand of literature in being 
also concerned with the question how the timing of risk resolution affects the attractiveness of a 
                                                 
2 See, in this context, Cubitt and Sugden (2001). 
3 In their experiment 18% of the participants were willing to pay a fixed fee of $0.50 to find out whether they won $20 
or were facing a probability of 60% (to be resolved in three weeks) to win $20. In the control treatment, in which the 
waiting period was just a few minutes rather than three weeks, only 6% agreed to pay the fee. The difference in 
proportions is only significant at the 13 percent level. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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gamble and the willingness to take risks. However, our experimental design is novel in several 
important respects. First of all, participants put their own money at risk in a real investment task. 
Thus, not only monetary incentives were provided, but also real (out of pocket) losses were made 
possible. Second, anticipated as well as experienced emotions were explicitly measured (as in 
Hopfensitz and van Winden, 2008). Moreover, for the first time, anticipatory emotions experienced 
during the waiting period under delayed resolution - which involved two days - were elicited. 
Furthermore, as detailed in the next section, we used the response to a web-based questionnaire 
administered before the experiment to obtain data on affective traits and risk taking in different life 
domains, while in an incentive compatible way participants’ preferences for resolution timing, risk, 
and time were measured during the experiment.   
  Our main findings are that delayed resolution can affect investment, that the effect depends 
on the risk involved, and that (among all the measures considered) only emotions can explain our 
results, albeit in ways that are not captured by the few existing affect models. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and 
procedures, along with theoretical predictions derived from the main models of decision making 
under risk. Section 3 discusses the behavioral results. Then, section 4 goes into the role of affect. It 
extends the analysis by first extracting some predictions from the relevant literature, which are 
subsequently tested through a regression model incorporating our affect measures. A further 
analysis of the role of affect takes place in section 5 where the data on recalled emotions are 
considered. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 




To investigate the relevance of the timing of the resolution of risk for investment behavior, the 
experiment comprises two sessions (two days apart). At the first session, participants are 
confronted with the following individual choice task. Each participant has to allocate 20 euro (of 
their own money) to two "projects", A and B, where Project A is safe while Project B is risky. The 
return from Project A is always 1.2 times the amount allocated to this project. The return from B 
depends on the experimental condition. There are two conditions in this respect. In the Low INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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Probability (LP) condition, Project B returns with probability p = 0.2, 9 times the invested amount 
and returns nothing with probability (1-p) = 0.8. In the High Probability (HP) condition, Project B 
returns with probability p = 0.8, 2.25 times the invested amount and nothing otherwise. For 
convenience, in the sequel, only the money that is allocated to the risky project B is called 
investment. Each of these two probability conditions is investigated for two further conditions 
concerning the timing of the resolution of the investment risk. The resolution either takes place in 
the same session immediately after the investment decision (Imm) or at the beginning of the second 
session (Del). Details are discussed when we deal with the procedures. Each participant in the 
experiment is randomly assigned to one of the resulting four treatments: LP-Imm, LP-Del, HP-Imm 
or HP-Del. 
Apart from the main investment task, three other tasks are employed to elicit potentially 
relevant preferences of the participants concerning timing of resolution, risk, and the time of 
payment (discount rate). First, after the investment decision, the preference for the timing of the 
risk resolution is measured by having participants indicate how much higher (or lower) the 
probability of the outcome from the risky project would have to be for them to be willing to switch 
to the other timing option (using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method for incentive compatibility). 
Second, at the second session (after the resolution of the risk), risk aversion is measured by having 
participants make multiple choices between two lotteries (on four multiple price list, see Harrison 
et al., 2006 for details and exact values used). Finally, at the end of the second session participants’ 
time preferences (discount rate) are elicited by having them indicate when they would like to 
receive their payout from the experiment. Participants could either decide to be paid out 
immediately (via a bank transfer the next day) or prefer to have their total earnings plus different 
levels of interest transferred in two months (also by bank transfer; design based on Coller and 
Williams, 1999). In all of these tasks one of the choices is randomly selected to be played out for 
real. See the Instructions in Appendix A for greater details. 
In addition to these revealed preferences measures, survey and self-report techniques are 
used to collect data on individual characteristics and emotions. In a web-based survey, to be 
completed before the first session of the experiment, data are obtained regarding demographic 
variables (age, gender, field of study) and some psychological traits. In view of the hypothesized 
importance of anxiety for decision making under uncertainty the survey includes the well-known 
STAI trait scale (Spielberger et al., 1970). Because of their apparent predictive power for risk INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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taking, it further contains a trait measure of sensation seeking (Arnett, 1994), a risk-propensity 
scale for various life domains (Nicholson et al., 2005) and a general risk attitude question (based on 
Dohmen et al., 2005). Details are provided in Appendix B.   
Because of our special interest in the role of affect, self-reports are used to measure the 
intensity with which various emotions are (1) anticipated at the time of the investment decision, (2) 
experienced after the resolution of the investment risk, and (3) recalled at the second session 
concerning the two-days waiting period in the treatments with delayed resolution.
4 For the first two 
measures we rely on earlier work (Hopfensitz and van Winden, 2008), while a novel measure is 
developed to deal with recalled emotions. The affect measures are further discussed below. 




The experiment was announced by email using a web-based recruiting system. Upon registration 
participants received a link to a web page with a series of questions, which they were required to 
fill out at least 24h prior to the start of the experiment. The collected information consisted of 
general demographic data, the STAI trait scale, the sensation seeking scale, and a series of 
questions to measure risk attitude, as discussed above. Responses were linked to behavior in the 
experiment through a password that each subject had to choose, to assure anonymity. Participants 
were required to sign up for two sessions, two days apart. These sessions took place either on a 
Monday and Wednesday, or on a Tuesday and Thursday. Participants were also informed that their 




                                                 
4 According to Robinson and Clore (2002) self-reports are "the most common and potentially the best way to measure a 





Upon arrival at the first session, participants were required to submit 20 euro in cash – which was 
explicitly mentioned in the announcement – and were asked to read and sign a participant consent 
form (see Appendix C). No one objected to this procedure. Subsequently, they were asked to draw 
a table number at random and to take their position in the lab, where they had to fill in immediately 
their password from the web questionnaire. Once everybody was seated, the instructions for the 
first part of the experiment were distributed and read aloud (see Appendix A). The instructions 
informed the participants about the investment task and the particular timing (Imm or Del) and 
probability (LP or HP) condition they would be facing. They then had to submit their investment 
decision with respect to their 20 euro on the computer. Immediately after their decision, 
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they had taken into account a number of 
anticipatory emotions (such as hope and worry) and a couple of other emotions related to how one 
would feel immediately after the resolution.
5 Subsequently, the instructions for the second part of 
the experiment were distributed.  
In this part, we measured participants’ preferred timing condition, using the procedure 
discussed above. Whether participants actually had to switch to the other timing condition was 
determined by the draw of a random number.
6 Participants in the immediate resolution condition 
subsequently had to roll two dice to resolve their investment risk, and were immediately after that 
asked to indicate the intensity with which they experienced a number of emotions (see Figure 1:A). 
For participants in the delayed resolution condition the session ended after the timing preference 
task. When all participants had finished, the first session ended and participants were reminded that 
they would only be paid after the second session two days later. 
 
                                                 
5 The six questions that were asked concerned the following emotions: "worry about the outcome", "enjoying hope for 
success", "excitement", "desire to know approximate earnings to plan expenditure", "expectation to feel really good in 
case of success", and "expectation to feel really bad in case of failure". In the delayed resolution treatment it was added 
to the first four (anticipatory) emotions: "during the two days to come". In addition, they were asked to state 
(hypothetically) the certainty equivalent of their gamble (given their investment decision); we will not use these 
hypothetical data in this paper. 





At the start of the second session participants had to present an ID before drawing a seat number for 
the lab. Once everybody was seated in the lab and had typed in their personal password, they were 
reminded of their respective decision or earnings from the first session. Participants who had their 
investment risk resolved at the first session were asked if knowing the outcome had influenced their 
spending behavior during the last two days. All others were asked to roll the dice to determine their 
investment outcome. Immediately after this dice roll, these participants had to indicate the strength 
of the emotions they experienced when observing the outcome. In addition, participants were asked 
to recall the intensity with which they had experienced a number of emotions during the two-day 
waiting period (see Figure 1:B). 
When finished, the instructions for the third part of the experiment were distributed. In this 
part risk preferences were elicited, using the multiple price list method, with one of the choices 
being randomly selected to be played out for real. The outcome was determined by having one 
participant roll dice (for the relevant choice and payoff). 
Finally, total earnings (from the first and third part of the experiment) were presented to the 
participants, followed by instructions for the fourth and last part of the experiment. In this part 
participants were asked to indicate for 17 different interest rates whether they would prefer to be 
paid out immediately (that is, through a bank transfer on the next day) or rather have their earnings 
plus interest transferred in two months. Which of the interest rates applied was again determined 
through a dice roll by one of the participants.  
Participants were then called one by one to the reception room where, under the supervision 
of a cashier (not being an experimenter), they completed a money transfer form with their own 
bank account number and their total earnings. Dependent on their payment choice, the form was 
collected in a box labeled "tomorrow" or "in two months". 
The experiment was conducted in September and October 2006 at the CREED laboratory of 
the University of Amsterdam. In total 127 mostly undergraduate students participated in 9 (double) 
sessions,
7 26% percent of which were women and 52% percent came from economics or business, 
                                                 
7 Data from one "second" session was lost. Missing values of risk aversion and time preference coefficients were 
replaced by sample means in regressions including these variables as explanatory variables, to make maximum use of 
the available data. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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while the others came from a variety of other disciplines. Each session took at most one hour and 
average (net) earnings amounted to about 25 euro. 
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Figure 1.  Order of events in the two timing treatments: Immediate (A) and Delayed (B)  
A: Immediate: INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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2.3 Predictions of EUT and CPT 
 
Splitting working money between two projects when all possible outcomes and associated 
probabilities are known can be analyzed with theories of decision making under risk. We start with 
predictions derived from Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Some other theoretical models, taking direct account of the role of 
affect, will be considered in Section 4. 
 
Expected Utility Theory. EUT predicts that the decision-maker chooses the investment level that 
maximizes his probability-weighed money-dependent utility. It has been argued (Rabin, 2000) that 
a utility function with wealth as argument should be virtually linear for amounts as small as those 
involved in our task. In that case, participants are predicted to invest everything in the risky project. 
On the other hand, taking experimental earnings as argument, many experimental studies show a 
non-trivial level of risk-aversion, with estimates of constant relative risk aversion roughly centered 
around the 0.3-0.6 range (Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2006). For this range, non-extreme 
investment is optimal under LP as well as HP. Furthermore, EUT would predict that risk-averse 
participants will find investment relatively more attractive under HP, as it involves a lower variance 
around the same mean, which suggests that investment under HP will be at least as large as under 
LP. 
As for the timing of the resolution of risk, standard theory predicts that early resolution will 
be (weakly) preferred due to planning considerations, implying that investment will be at least as 
high under immediate resolution (treatment Imm) as under delayed resolution (treatment Del). 
However, this effect is expected to be negligible in the experiment, because the distance in time is 
very short (only 2 days) while the amount of money at stake forms only a minuscule fraction of a 
participant’s life-time wealth. 
In short, EUT predicts maximal investment if utility is a function of wealth, while it is 
compatible with any level of investment if utility is a function of experimental earnings. 
Furthermore, it predicts higher investment under HP than LP and virtually no effect of the timing of 
the resolution of risk. 
 
Cumulative Prospect Theory. In CPT (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), it is important to know the 
decision maker's reference point defining losses and gains. While there is little theory to go by INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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(Koszegi and Rabin, 2006), in our case, the 20 euro that participants had to provide seems to be a 
natural reference point. Consequently earnings from the investment task falling short of 20 should 
be perceived as losses and earnings in excess of 20 as gains.
8 Note that in that case 3 euro is the 
highest investment level in the experiment for which the decision maker will certainly not make 
losses. Furthermore, empirical studies of CPT generally show an almost linear value function for 
small amounts. In our case, this would lead to an extreme prediction of either maximal investment 
(20 euro) or very low investment (0 or 3 euro). The probably most often employed 
parameterization, based on Tversky and Kahneman (1992), uses as value function a power function 
for gains and for losses (with a kink at the reference point representing loss aversion). The 





1−γ, and a similar 
function is assumed to hold for losses (with δ substituted for γ). In this approach the parameters of 
the value function (denoted by α for gains and β for losses), the probability weighting functions (γ 
and δ) and loss aversion (λ) can vary across subjects. Taking median estimates of these parameters 
(α = β = 0.88, γ = 0.61, δ = 0.69, and λ = 2.25), investment of just 3 euro should be observed for 
either probability treatment (LP and HP). However, more recent studies suggest that median loss 
aversion may in fact be lower (see Abdellaoui et al., 2006, and references therein). If we set λ = 
1.75 maximal investment under both probability conditions is predicted.  
In general, the extreme nature of the prediction is neither idiosyncratic to the particular 
parameters of our gamble nor to the assumption regarding the reference point. As long as the value 
function has little curvature, the expected marginal utility of investment is nearly constant, which 
makes it typically optimal to either put everything in the risky project or nothing (or, perhaps, the 
highest amount that cannot lead to losses). Theoretically, CPT thus yields support for the wide-
spread practice of presenting only binary choices to participants, because with a (quasi-) continuous 
investment space only the extremes are predicted to be chosen. It remains to be seen whether this 
holds empirically.
9 
Without assumptions imposed on the distribution of parameters among the participants, it is 
difficult to predict whether investment will be higher under HP or LP. Consider, for example, an 
individual with relatively low loss aversion (λ = 1.75) and a mildly concave value function (α = β 
                                                 
8 This should not be affected by the prospect of winning extra money during the second session as the latter was 
basically meant to cover the opportunity cost of participating in that session.  
9 Experimental findings with a similar investment task suggest, however, that a substantial proportion of non-extreme 
choices may be expected (Hopfensitz and van Winden, 2008) INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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= 0.88 or α = β = 0.8). Then, if probabilities are heavily distorted (say, γ = 0.5), CPT predicts very 
high investment for LP but not for HP. If, however, the individual weighs probabilities in an almost 
linear manner (0.8 < γ < 1), exactly the opposite is true. 
In short, CPT predicts extreme investment choices, given that the value function is 
supposed to have little curvature (for small stakes). Whether investment is higher under HP or LP 
depends on the particular distribution of the parameters. However, assuming commonly used 
parameter estimates, and 20 euro being the reference, an investment level of just 3 euro is predicted 
under both HP and LP. Furthermore, for the same reason as holds for EUT, no effect of the timing 
of the resolution of risk is expected. 
 
 
3  Behavioral results 
 
This section starts with our findings regarding participants' investment decisions in the different 
treatments. Then, we turn to the results of the tasks eliciting the preference for the timing of the risk 
resolution, risk aversion, and time preference. Finally, we will use these experimental findings to 




Figure 2 shows the distribution of investment in each of the four treatments: LP-Imm, LP-Del, HP-
Imm, and HP-Del. It turns out that investment is higher under HP than LP in both timing conditions  
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test
10:  p < 0.01; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p < 0.01). More 
specifically, mean investment is nearly 5 euro (about 50%) higher under HP. Also, maximal   
investment (20 euro) is much more frequent under HP (48%) than under LP (23%), while 
investment below 10 euro is very rare under HP but not under LP. This leads to our first result. 
 
RESULT 1 Investment is higher under HP than LP. 
 
 
                                                 




Next, we compare the invested amounts across the timing treatments. On average, investment is 
some 2.8 euro higher under the immediate resolution of risk. However, the effect is not equally 
strong for both probability treatments. For LP the difference is just 1.4 euro and statistically no  
difference in the distributions is observed (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test: p=0.27; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test: p = 0.71). For HP, we find some weak evidence for higher investment under 
immediate resolution of risk (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test: p < 0.10; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p 
= 0.21). The difference in mean investment is about 2.5 euro. Moreover, under delayed resolution 
median investment equals 15 euro, while the majority of the participants choose maximal 
investment under immediate resolution. Additional support for these results is obtained by 
combining all the data in a two-way ANOVA. Again, we find a clear effect of probability (p < 
0.01) and a weaker impact of timing (p = 0.056), with no interaction effect. The following result 
summarizes. 
 
RESULT 2 In HP, investment is (weakly) higher under the immediate resolution of risk (Imm).  
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Furthermore, though full investment is the mode in each treatment, a strong heterogeneity in 
investment choices, spread over the whole investment space, can be observed.  
 
RESULT 3 In all treatments except for HP-Imm, the majority of the participants choose 
intermediate investment levels. 
 
3.2 Preference for timing, risk aversion, and discount rate 
 
In the experiment three different individual preferences – regarding the timing of the resolution, 
risk, and time – were elicited because of their potential relevance for observed investment. We first 
discuss our findings concerning these preferences. Their influence on investment behavior will be 
analyzed in the next subsection. 
Participants’ preferences for the timing of the resolution of the investment risk were elicited 
in the second part of the experiment. It turns out that about 50% of the participants are willing to 
take a "non-trivial" loss of at least 22.5 eurocents in expected terms (which corresponds to a 
decrease of one percentage point in the probability of winning in HP for an investment of 10 euro) 
in order to obtain (or keep) their preferred risk resolution condition.
 11 However, if we take one euro 
as a non-trivial cutoff point (corresponding to a similar change in expected terms in LP) this 
proportion drops to about 10%. Although the proportion is larger in LP under both cutoff points, 
the difference is not significant. Moreover, using a Mann-Whitney test, we cannot reject a similar 
willingness to pay (in expected terms) in HP and LP. Furthermore, no correlation with investment 
is observed (see also below). 
 
RESULT 4 With an expected loss of at least 22.50 eurocents, about half of the participants show a 
preference for changing the timing of the risk resolution, virtually always in the direction of 
immediate resolution (Imm). With an expected loss of 1 euro, this share drops to 10%. No 
difference between the probability treatments (LP and HP) is observed.              
                                                 
11 More specifically, we have computed for each participant the expected loss resulting from accepting a lower 
probability of winning in the preferred timing condition. Suppose, for example, that someone invested 10 euro in the 
HP condition and was indifferent between an 80 percent probability of winning under immediate resolution and 82 
percent probability of winning under delayed resolution of risk. This means that the additional gain of 10 × 2.25 = 22.5 
euro is foregone with a probability of 2 percentage points. In other words, this person is willing to pay up to 0.02 × 22.5 
= 45 eurocent in expected terms in order to obtain the preferred timing resolution. It turns out that the median of this 




The third and fourth part of the experiment concerned the elicitation of participants’ risk aversion 
and time preference (discount rate). To obtain individual risk aversion estimates from the choices 
made in the risk preference task we follow the procedure used in earlier studies (Holt and Laury, 
2002; Harrison et al., 2006).
12 The distribution of the estimated (constant) relative risk aversion 
parameters, across all treatments, is presented in Figure 3. Median estimated risk-aversion is about 
0.595, which is between the estimates reported by Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. 
(2006). Thus, it seems that the fact that participants had to bring their own money did not lead to a 
substantial selection bias in this respect. 
As behavior in the risk preference task could have been influenced by the outcome of the 
investment task, we checked whether winning or losing in the investment task influenced the 
estimated risk aversion. For example, as suggested by prospect theory, participants who lost some 
of their money in the investment task might have taken more risk in the risk preference task. To 
check for this possibility, we correlated the (exogenous) dummy variable indicating winning or 
losing in the investment task with estimated risk aversion. Even though our experimental design 
(playing with your own money) would seem to make losses particularly salient, no significant 
relationship is found (Spearman’s rho = 0.144, p = 0.151). Below, we will therefore use estimated 
risk aversion as an exogenous variable to explain investment. 
                                                 
12 Assuming a CRRA utility function: U(x) = x
1-r/(1-r),  we compute for each of the four lists of binary choices the 
value of r corresponding to indifference in a particular row. Thus, switching at a given row is associated with an 
interval for the value of r. Midpoints of the relevant four intervals (corresponding to the four lists) are averaged to 
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In the fourth and final part of the experiment, we measured participants’ discount rates with 
the time preference task. Again, midpoints of the intervals consistent with switching at a given 
amount were used. The individual discount rates are roughly in line with those encountered in the 
literature. The median annual discount rate is 0.35. Coller and Williams (1999) obtain a value of 
about 0.2, depending on treatment, which would suggest that our participants were more impatient. 
However, note that the amounts involved in our study were substantially lower, which typically 
leads to heavier discounting (Frederick et al, 2002). Furthermore, the earlier payment was to be 
made "within about a week" rather than in a month time as in Coller and Williams’ case, thus 
possibly leaving room for the immediacy effect (see e.g. Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991). Also in this 
respect, we do not think that our participants formed a biased sample. 
We checked for correlation between estimated risk aversion and individual discount rates, 
and observe only a very weak positive correlation between the two parameters (Pearson’s r = 0.18, 
p = 0.084; Spearman’s rho = 0.097, p = 0.362). This seems in line with the mixed findings of some 
recent studies.
13 Moreover, estimated risk aversion is not correlated with the (self-reported) 
tendency to take risk in any of the five life domains considered or to take risk "in general". This is 
consistent with the notion that the propensity to take risk is a multi-faceted trait (MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung, 1986; Dohmen et al., 2005).   
 
3.3 Findings versus predictions 
 
Comparing first our Results 1-3 with the theoretical predictions, we find some mixed evidence for 
EUT but little support for CPT. While Result 1 (higher investment under HP than LP) and Result 3 
(non-extreme investment) are compatible with EUT, both results fly in the face of CPT assuming 
standard parameter estimates.
14 On the other hand, Result 2, suggesting an impact of the timing of 
the resolution of risk, is hard to reconcile with both EUT and CPT as planning considerations do 
not seem to play a significant role (we will return to this issue below).
15  
Further evidence can be obtained by using the risk aversion (CRRA) estimates to generate 
predictions at the individual level (using the utility function: U(x) = x
1-r). Figure 4 presents the 
                                                 
13 For example, Anderhub et al. (2001) find some positive correlation (with significance depending on the treatment of 
the data), while van Praag and Booij (2003) obtain a moderately negative correlation in their dataset. 
14 Also, we find little evidence of an investment of 3 being prominent. Only 7 out of 127 participants (5.5%) chose this 
particular level.  
15 This result further contrasts with Noussair and Wu’s (2006) finding of more risk aversion when lotteries are 
immediately resolved. We will return to this study in the next section. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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frequency distributions of actual investment and investment predicted by EUT, for LP and HP 
(pooled across timing). Although EUT correctly predicts a spike at maximal investment and, on 
average, a higher investment level under HP, nevertheless, for each probability treatment the 
hypothesis that actual and predicted investment come from the same distribution is rejected 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p < 0.001 for LP, and p = 0.016 for HP). 
Moreover, EUT has little predictive power at the individual level. Even though predicted 
and actual investment levels are positively correlated under LP (Spearman’s rho= 0.247, p = 0.077) 
this is not at all the case under HP (Spearman’s rho = 0.018, p = 0.900).
16 
Obtaining individual level predictions for CPT is much more difficult, as more parameters 
would have to be estimated from the risk-preference task, which is not well-suited for that purpose. 
Therefore we are not able to asses predictive success of CPT at the individual level. All we can say 




CONCLUSION 1 Overall, the predictive power of both EUT and CPT turns out to be poor. 
Assuming standard estimates of (constant relative) risk aversion, EUT successfully predicts the 
higher investment in HP and the typical non-extreme investment levels in both HP and LP. 
However, it fails to predict the behavioral impact of (and preferences for) the timing of the 
resolution of the investment risk; also, an individually calibrated EUT model has to be rejected 
both at the aggregate and individual level. Assuming standard parameterizations, CPT fails to 
predict our findings, particularly those regarding intermediate investment and resolution timing. 
 
Given the weak predictive power of EUT and CPT, and to prepare the ground for a further analysis 
incorporating affect, we will now use a (censored Tobit) regression model to assess the influence of 
a number of exogenous variables on investment. Explanatory variable are: the different treatments 
(with HP-Imm taken as base category), estimated risk aversion, the estimated discount rate, the 
self-reported tendency to take risk (including the general risk question), gender, age, and field of 
study (economics or otherwise). Results are presented under Model 1 in Table 1. The reader is 
kindly requested to ignore for the moment the other two models in this table, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
                                                 
16 Results are not very different if the correlations are conditional on winning or losing in the investment task. 
17 For some other experimental evidence against CPT as a theory of risky decision making, see Birnbaum (2004). INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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Note that only the three treatment dummies show significant coefficients. Neither estimated risk 
aversion, nor the individual discount rate, nor the self-reported risk attitude
18 show significance 
(and the same holds for gender, age, and being an economist or not). Only the probability and the 
timing of the resolution appear to matter, and the respective regression outcomes corroborate 
Results 1 and 2 above. In line with Result 2, investment in HP is lower under delayed resolution of 
risk (HP-Del), while no timing effect is observed for LP because the corresponding coefficients are 
not significantly different. Furthermore, since the coefficient of HP-Del is larger than the 
coefficients related to LP, investment is higher under HP than LP, in line with Result 1. 
 
 
4  The role of affect  
 
Our experimental results suggest that a model allowing for an intrinsic preference for the timing of 
the resolution of investment risk should be considered. Path-breaking in this respect is an early 
model of Kreps and Porteus (1978) which allows for such a preference. In their model, inter-
temporal decisions obey a "temporal consistency" axiom, which requires that a choice at time t 
                                                 
18 Similar results are obtained when general tendency to take risk is used instead. 
0 5 10 15 20
Mean=11.0; Median=10; n=77
LP




0 5 10 15 20
Mean=7.3; Median=3; n=77
LP
0 5 10 15 20
Mean=13.7; Median=16; n=50
HP
Prediction based on individual CRRA and EUT

























































0 5 10 15 20
Mean=11.0; Median=10; n=77
LP




0 5 10 15 20
Mean=7.3; Median=3; n=77
LP
0 5 10 15 20
Mean=13.7; Median=16; n=50
HP
Prediction based on individual CRRA and EUT
















































































































0.2INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
19 
 
between two lotteries that bring the same immediate consumption will not be reversed at time t+1. 
As a result, investment should only depend on the time between the resolution of risk and payment, 
not on the time between the decision and the resolution. Translated to our experiment, this model 
would predict no effect of the timing of the risk resolution on investment, unless being paid in 
about seven days (time consumed by the bank transfer) rather than nine days (including the two 
days in between the sessions) matters; which seems highly unlikely.  Nevertheless, we find that the 
timing does influence investment, albeit only in the high probability treatment. The temporal 
consistency axiom effectively nullifies the potential impact of anticipatory emotions, like hope or 
worry (Wu, 1999). Because any delay in the resolution of risk can trigger anticipatory emotions, we 
now turn to a discussion of the potential role of affect, including some recent models that do take 
anticipatory emotions into account.  
 
4.1 Predictions based on the literature 
 
Based on the literature, affect can play a role in both dimensions of the investment task: risk and 
time of resolution. The former has been studied by Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) who regard both 
HP and LP as mixed gambles, characterized by the possibility of a loss
19. They find that these 
gambles are less attractive to people than gambles with the same (positive) expected value but only 
positive outcomes: "The most striking effect of the data (…) is the dramatic effect of the possibility 
of a loss" (p. 183). Moreover, their data suggest that mixed gambles with a higher mean-preserving 
spread are less attractive, which in turn suggests that LP is experienced as less attractive than HP. 
Thus, we arrive at the following prediction: 
 
P1  Under the immediate resolution of risk, investment is predicted to be higher in HP than LP, due 
to the greater attractiveness of the former type of gamble. 
                                                 
19 The loss in Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) is hypothetical in contrast with our study. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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Table 1. Regression modeling of investment choices (censored Tobit regression) 
Explanatory  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
variables:  coefficient  St. Er.  coefficient  St. Er.  coefficient  St. Er. 
LP_Imm  -9.04**  2.24 -4.78*  2.22 -4.61*  2.18 
HP_Del  -4.96*  2.52 -4.41  2.34 -3.81  2.31 
LP_Del -10.33**  2.11  -7.18**
  2.10 -6.83**  2.09 
Risk  aversion  -1.63  2.24 -0.97  1.83    
Discount  rate  -0.97  1.24 -1.48  1.05    
Risk in life domains  1.32  1.05  0.37  0.96     
Anxiety trait      0.06  1.65  -0.67  1.60 
Sensation seeking      -1.67  1.99  -1.35  1.84 
HP-Imm x PAEF
a     5.95**  2.11  5.70**  2.12 
HP-Del x PAEF      0.39  1.47  0.73  1.44 
LP-Imm x PAEF      1.83  1.21  1.97  1.23 
LP-Del x PAEF      2.86*
  1.19 3.24**  1.18 
HP-Imm x NAEF
b     -5.12*
  2.18 -5.00*
  2.12 
HP-Del x NAEF      -3.97**  1.48  -3.98**  1.48 
LP-Imm x NAEF      -4.64**  1.25  -4.42**  1.24 
LP-Del x NAEF      -3.16**  0.96  -2.88**  0.95 
Female  -1.61  1.68 -2.79  1.47 -2.79  1.48 
Age  0.03  0.26 0.10  0.21 0.12  0.20 
Economist  2.18  1.48 1.16  1.20 1.01  1.19 
Constant 17.59
  0.01 21.70
  0.01 21.00
  0.01 
Pseudo  R2  0.05   0.13   0.13  
N  117   117   117     
Model comparison  1 vs. 2    2 vs. 3       
LR  chi2  55.64   2.82      
p-value  <  0.001   0.42      
* significant at 5% level ** significant at 1% level. 
a PAEF stands for Positive Anticipated Emotions Factor; 
b NAEF stands for Negative Anticipated 
Emotions Factor.  
 
 
With respect to the second dimension – the time of resolution – it is analytically useful to 
distinguish between three factors: (a) how people feel about a delay as such, (b) emotional arousal 
related to the length of the delay, and (c) the relative weight given to different future emotions. 
Lovallo and Kahneman’s (2000) study suggests a general dislike for delayed resolution, especially 
for mixed gambles (see also Albrecht and Weber, 1997; Eliaz and Schotter, 2007). In the 
theoretical model of Caplin and Leahy (2001), anxiety arises when future consumption is uncertain, 
which in turn reduces the attractiveness of investment (because of the anticipated negative hedonic INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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value of anxiety). As a result, immediate resolution is expected to be preferred while investment 
should be lower under delayed resolution. This leads to the next prediction: 
 
P2  In both HP and LP, investment will be negatively influenced by a delay in resolution because of 
a general dislike for delay. 
 
Regarding emotional arousal during the waiting period, psychological studies suggest that 
anticipatory emotions will show a U-shaped profile over the time interval, with the stronger 
intensities showing up immediately after the investment decision and just before the resolution of 
the risk (Caplin and Leahy, 2001). Moreover, a longer waiting period would result in a markedly 
greater buildup of anticipatory emotions than a shorter period (see also Wu, 1999). Assuming that 
people anticipate this greater buildup – as in the theoretical models of Caplin and Leahy (CL) and 
Wu (W) – a stronger role of affect is predicted with delayed resolution of risk. On the other hand, 
empirical findings by Loewenstein (L) and others suggest that people give lesser weight to, and 
underestimate the impact of their future emotions in decision making (Loewenstein, 1996; 
Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999). This suggest that the role of affect would be weaker under the 
delayed resolution of risk. Thus, we have the following two opposing predictions: 
 
P3 (CL and W)  The role of affect is predicted to be stronger under delayed resolution of risk. 
 
P3 (L)  The role of affect is predicted to be weaker under delayed resolution of risk. 
 
Finally, regarding the relative weight given to different future emotions, again two opposing 
predictions can be derived from the literature. Based on Caplin and Leahy’s model, negative 
(anxiety-related) emotions are predicted to be relatively more important, particularly in LP with its 
larger variance in outcomes. The theoretical model of Wu (1999), on the other hand, proposes that 
individuals overestimate very positive and very negative yet unlikely outcomes. In the first case, 
hope inflates the perceived chance of winning, while in the latter case anxiety inflates the perceived 
chance of losing. In our experiment, this would lead to a more positive assessment of investment in 
LP and a more negative one in HP. As a result, based on Wu’s model, investment is predicted to be 
positively (negatively) affected in LP (HP). By the same token, immediate resolution would be INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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preferred under HP, while delay would be welcomed under LP. Some experimental support for a 
switching preference for uncertainty resolution is provided by Albrecht and Weber (1996). 
Furthermore, Chew and Ho (1994) find that enjoyment of delayed resolution (hope) is more 
prevalent in case of small probability of winning.
20 The following prediction summarizes the two 
(partly) opposing predictions. 
 
P4 (CL) Negative (anxiety-related) emotions are predicted to be relative more important, 
particularly in LP, inducing a negative impact on investment. 
 
P4 (W)  Negative (anxiety-related) emotions are predicted to be relatively more important in HP, 
while positive (hope-related) emotions are predicted to be more important in LP. Consequently, 
anticipatory emotions are expected to have a negative impact on investment in HP and a positive 
impact in LP. 
 
Note that to the extent that P3 (CL and W) holds, the effects referred to under P4 should be 
expected to be stronger in HP-Del and LP-Del. 
 
4.2 A regression model incorporating affect 
 
We now turn to an analysis of how affect is related to investment in the experiment. We start with 
some general evidence of the role played by affective traits and states. Thereafter, the regression 
model of section 3 will be extended to incorporate our affect measures, followed by tests of the 
predictions presented in the previous subsection. 
As discussed in the design section, we measured sensation seeking and trait anxiety (in the 
web-questionnaire) as potentially important affective traits. While sensation seeking is seen as a 
predisposition for excitement about taking risks (Arnett, 1994), the opposite holds for trait anxiety 
which predisposes people to experience anxiety under uncertainty (Spielberger et al., 1970). 
Therefore, we expect sensation seeking (trait anxiety) to be positively (negatively) correlated with 
investment. Moreover, because a prolonged waiting period gives anticipatory emotions more time 
to build up (see above), these correlations might be stronger under delayed resolution of risk. 
                                                 
20 Both studies use hypothetical decision problems. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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However, we find only a significant (negative) correlation for trait anxiety, and only in case of 
immediate resolution of risk (Spearman’s rho  -0.419,  p < 0.01).
21 Sensation seeking shows a 
positive but insignificant correlation with investment under both timing conditions. Below, we will 
investigate via a regression analysis whether these unexpected findings are robust when we control 
for other factors. 
For a first assessment of the importance of affective states across the resolution timing 
conditions, we simply look at the means of the self-reported intensity with which various 
anticipated emotions played a role when the investment decision was made. See Table 2.  
For all these emotions it turns out that their role is (much) more pronounced in the 
treatments with immediate resolution of risk. Moreover, as the test results show, the difference in 
importance is significant for the anticipatory emotions: Hope, Excitement, and Worry. This is also 
true if we control for the probability of successful investment. In both HP and LP, the differences 
for the three anticipatory emotions stay significant (p < 0.05), except for Excitement under HP, 
where it becomes only weakly so (p = 0.10). In contrast, the prospect of feeling good or bad about 
the outcome of the resolution, and the measure of how much they Want To Know, appear to play a 
similar role in both timing conditions.
22 We will return to these findings below.  
Because of the substantial correlations among the anticipated emotions, we performed a 
factor analysis to identify the main dimensions for the regression analysis below. It turns out that 
two factors represent more than 60 percent of the overall variance of the six emotion items; see 
Table 3. The first can be identified as a Positive Anticipated Emotions Factor (PAEF), with as 
prominent emotions Hope, Excitement, and Good Feeling Ex Post. The second can be identified as 
a Negative Anticipated Emotions Factor (NAEF), with as prominent emotions Worry, Bad Feeling 
Ex Post, and Want To Know. We expect PAEF (NAEF) to have a positive (negative) impact on 
investment.  
                                                 
21 This outcome supports Hopfensitz and van Winden (2008) who find some weak experimental evidence for a negative 
effect of trait anxiety in a similar investment task with immediate resolution. 
22 The variable Want To Know stands for the statement: "I wanted to know approximately how much I would win to 
plan my expenses". The idea was to tap with this statement the importance of the economic planning consideration 
discussed in subsection 2.3. To our surprise, the mean response was higher for Immediate (where clearly no expenses 
can take place between the decision and the resolution) than for Delayed. Further, it did not correlate with the response 
to the question about actual changes in expenses asked during the second session. (The latter also suggested that the 
planning consideration was weak, with the majority of the subjects stating that they did not adjust their spending, 
choosing 0 or 1 on a 5-point scale). Given the correlation of Want To Know with Bad Feeling Ex Post (0.31, p < .01), 
but not with Good Feeling Ex Post, it seems to relate more to avoiding negative monetary surprises. See also the factor 




Table 2. Intensity of anticipated emotions under immediate and delayed resolution.  








Immediate  resolution  4.101 3.288 4.338 2.542 4.338 3.254 
Delayed  resolution  1.500 2.294 4.176 1.294 3.029 2.852 





p < 0.01 
 
p < 0.01 
 
p = 0.68 
 
p < 0.01 
 
p = 0.38 
 
p = 0.31 
 
 
  To evaluate the role of affect and to test the predictions of subsection 4.1, we expand our 
regression model of subsection 3.3 (Model 1) by including the affective trait variables (sensation 
seeking and trait anxiety) and the two identified anticipated emotions factors: NAEF and PAEF.    
The latter are interacted with the treatment dummies.
23 The results are shown under Model 2 in  
Table 1. Note from the Pseudo-R
2 value and the likelihood ratio test, at the bottom of the table, that 
the new model performs significantly better. Moreover, leaving out the economic variables – see 
Model 3 in the table – does not affect its explanatory power (see the comparison of Model 2 and 
Model 3), and hardly affects the results in a qualitative sense. We focus, therefore, on the more 




Table 3. Factor analysis of anticipated emotions  
                                     Factor Loading 
               PAEF
a NAEF
a 
Hope                0.842 0.314
Excitement               0.830 0.003
Good Feeling Ex Post               0.613 - 0.244
Worry                0.274  0.796
Bad Feeling Ex Post               -0.310  0.725
Want To Know               -0.179  0.620
Proportion of variance explained
b                0.329  0.284
a PAEF (NAEF) stands for Positive (Negative) Anticipated Emotions Factor.  
b The proportions of variance explained by the third and fourth factor were only 13.1 and 12.2 percent, respectively.  
 
                                                 
23 As in Model 1, willingness to pay in the resolution timing task shows no relation with investment if added as variable 
or interaction term. Note, in this context, that willingness to pay was measured after the investment decision, which 
should already have adjusted for emotions, including the unattractiveness of delay (they could not renew their 
investment decision). This may be the reason that relatively few people spend a non-trivial amount on switching (about 
10% at least 1 euro). As a consequence, variation may be too little to capture an effect. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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First, note that the importance of the treatment dummies has decreased substantially. More 
specifically, the coefficients of LP-Imm and LP-Del are about 40% smaller, while the coefficient of 
HP-Del is now only weakly significant (p = 0 .10).
24 Second, no direct effect is observed from the 
trait variables (trait-anxiety and sensation seeking). However, we notice that trait-anxiety is 
correlated with NAEF (Spearman’s rho = 0.2431,  p = 0.006), while sensation seeking is correlated 
with PAEF (Spearman’s rho = 0.1559, p = 0.0081), which is in line with emotion traits being 
dispositions for emotion states. Third, there appears to be an asymmetry in the impact of negative 
and positive anticipated emotions. While negative anticipated emotions (NAEF) always play a role, 
resolution timing and risk affect the impact of the positive anticipated emotions (PAEF). The latter 
are influential in HP only under immediate resolution and in LP only under delayed resolution.
25 
Fourth, the impact of both NAEF and PAEF is weaker under delayed resolution, except for the 
effect of PAEF in LP-Del. Finally, investment now appears to be (weakly) lower for female 
participants, which supports earlier findings (e.g. Charness and Gneezy, 2004; Bajtelsmit et al, 
1997). We next compare our results with the predictions presented in the previous subsection.  
 
P1  Two pieces of evidence support the prediction concerning the relative attractiveness of HP-
Imm compared to LP-Imm: (i) the positive influence of PAEF in HP-Imm, while in LP-Imm only 
NAEF shows an impact; (ii) the fact that the value of NAEF in LP-Imm is larger than in HP-Imm 
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p = 0.027), while there is no difference regarding the value of 
PAEF. 
 
P2  Some support for the predicted general dislike for delay and its negative effect on investment is 
provided by the (weakly) negative effect of the dummy for HP-Del and the (non-significantly) 
larger coefficient of the dummy for LP-Del. Moreover, we observed before a predominant 
willingness to pay for switching to the early resolution timing condition (see subsection 3.2). 
                                                 
24 Although the coefficient of LP-Imm is less negative, again, it does not significantly differ from that of LP-Del.  
25 Incidentally, the overall stronger impact of negative emotions is in line with many similar findings in the 
psychological literature (Baumeister et al., 2001). INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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P3  Substantial evidence is found for a weaker role of affect under delayed resolution, supporting 
P3 (L). The values of NAEF and PAEF are smaller under delayed resolution and, if anything, their 
impact tends to be weaker.
26 
 
P4  In support of Wu’s model (W), we find a relatively stronger impact of negative emotions 
(NAEF) in HP-Del and of positive emotions (PAEF) in LP-Del. On the other hand, the relatively 
stronger effect of PAEF (NAEF) observed in HP-Imm (LP-Imm) runs against this model, while 
providing some support for Caplin and Leahy’s model (CL) concerning LP.
27 
 
The next conclusion summarizes our explanation of the timing effect observed in the experiment. 
 
CONCLUSION 2  Predictions P1, P2, and P4 (W) find substantial support in our experimental 
data. Together they offer an affect-based explanation for the resolution timing effect observed in 
HP. Driving factor is the relative attractiveness of HP-Imm (P1). Under delayed resolution both in 
HP-Del and LP-Del investment is (weakly) negatively affected by a general dislike of delay (P2) 
and by negative anticipated emotions, which are only in LP-Del countered by a positive impact of 
positive anticipated emotions (P4 (W)). This results in a clear (negative) effect of delayed 
resolution in HP only. In addition, there is evidence of a weaker role of anticipated emotions under 
delayed resolution, supporting P3 (L).
28  
                                                 
26 The values of PAEF and NAEF are lower in the delayed treatment for each probability condition separately p < 0.01 
in each pairwise comparison (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test), except for NAEF under HP, where p = 0.07). The impact 
of PAEF is greater under immediate than delayed resolution for HP (t-test, p = 0.05) but not significantly different for 
LP. The impact of NAEF is lower (in absolute terms) under delayed resolution for both probability treatments, albeit 
not significantly so. 
27 Overall, we find only limited evidence in favor of the existing affect models of delayed resolution. As noted above, 
in contrast with Wu’s model, for instance, we find a relatively stronger effect of PAEF (NAEF) in HP-Imm (LP-Imm). 
Against Caplin and Leahy’s model appears to run the finding of a similar value of NAEF in both HP-Del and LP-Del, 
as well as the finding that the coefficients of the NAEF variables are not more negative in LP than HP. Moreover, 
against both models appears to run the observation of a generally weaker impact and lower intensity of anticipated 
emotions under delayed resolution. Finally, note from the components of NAEF and PAEF that it is not only 
anticipatory emotions that count, but also emotions experienced after the resolution, which are neglected in both 
models.  
28 Because of the observed role of affect, the experiment of Noussair and Wu (2006), who found greater risk aversion 
under immediate than under delayed resolution, seems problematic. Their experiment consisted of two rounds, with 
(always in the same order) the immediate resolution task in the first round, and the delayed resolution task in the 
second round (using Holt and Laury’s (2002) design). However, the resolution under "immediate" in fact occurred after 
subjects had finished the second round. Consequently, subjects were presumably still experiencing anticipatory 
emotions when making their decisions in the second round, which may have influenced their decisions. Another, 
technically problematic issue is that they did not allow for indifference in their risk preference task, while only about 




The following section provides some further evidence of the differential role of emotions under the 
immediate and the delayed resolution of risk, based on the experimental data regarding experienced 
and recalled emotions.  
     
    
5  Experienced and recalled emotions 
 
Our experimental findings concerning the emotion factors NAEF and PAEF suggest that 
anticipatory and ex post (after resolution) experienced emotions play an important role in the 
investment decision. This supports theoretical modeling attempts to deal with prospect-based 
emotions like anxiety or regret. However, an open question is to what extent these anticipated 
emotions are later actually experienced (that is, well forecast) and whether there is an effect of the 
timing of the resolution of risk in this respect. Insight into this issue is important, because a 
discrepancy between anticipated and experienced emotions would point at a conflict between 
decision utility and experienced utility (cf. Kahneman et al., 1997). Another issue concerns the 
assumptions made in the recent affect models of decision-making under risk regarding the time-
profile of anticipatory emotions, that is, the development of these emotions during the waiting 
period. Both issues will be investigated next, using our data on experienced and recalled 
emotions.
29 
First, we examine whether the anticipated "good feeling ex post" (in case of successful 
investment) and "bad feeling ex post" (in case of failure) were actually experienced. To analyze this 
issue we have constructed an index of "positive experienced emotions" (PEE) and one of "negative 
experienced emotions" (NEE), by summing up the intensity scores regarding the relevant emotions 
(for PEE: happiness and excitement; for NEE: sadness, disappointment, regret, and irritation). For 
subjects who actually observed a negative investment outcome, it turns out that NEE is not 
correlated with the extent to which they had taken into account the "expectation to feel really bad in 
case of failure" in their investment decision. On the other hand, for subjects who were successful, 
PEE is found to be highly correlated with the weight attached to the "expectation to feel really good 
in case of success", albeit only under the immediate resolution of risk (Imm) and only significantly 
                                                 
29 The latter were only collected from the participants in the treatments with delayed risk resolution, to avoid an 
overload of emotion measures within a short time interval; see Figure 1. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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so in case of HP-Imm (Spearman’s rho = 0.66, p < 0.01). The correlation is also high in LP-Imm 
(rho = 0.5), but the small number of wins precludes statistical significance.  Because the 
anticipation of feeling real bad in case of failure induces less investment (in line with the negative 
effect of NAEF in Table 1) while, if anything, investment will be reinforced by the expectation of 
feeling real good, the more interesting result seems to be the lack of correlation for PEE under the 
delayed resolution of risk.
30 In line with this outcome, we find at the single emotion level that five 
of the six significant correlations between (equally valenced) anticipated and experienced emotions 
concern Imm. It appears, therefore, that subjects were able to predict their emotions only when the 
resolution of the investment risk followed immediately, and more so in case of investment success 
than in case of failure. 
Our data on recalled emotions allow us to explore the second issue, concerning the validity 
of assumptions made in models of decision-making under risk about the development of various 
anticipatory emotions during the waiting period. Based on Wu (1999) one can expect anxiety to be 
particularly prominent under HP, while this should hold for LP according to Caplin and Leahy 
(2001). In contrast with the latter prediction, Chew and Ho (1994) suggest that hope would be 
prominent under LP. Moreover, according to Wu emotional intensity should build up over the time 
interval (see also Loewenstein et al., 2001), while Caplin and Leahy suggest a U-shaped pattern 
with high intensities also immediately after the investment decision. However, in both cases a 
greater build up of emotional intensity is expected the longer the time interval. Our elicitation 
technique, to be discussed next, allows for a direct measure. 
To identify the time pattern of anticipatory emotions experienced during the waiting period, 
we used an elicitation method, inspired by Sonnemans (1991), focusing on the four emotions: hope, 
excitement, anxiety, and irritation. For each emotion participants were shown a line representing 
the forty-eight hours between the moment the investment decision was made (at the first session) 
and the moment the resolution of the risk took place (at the second session). Participants were 
asked to report each instance they experienced the given emotion by clicking on one of the forty-
eight line segments corresponding to the time at which the emotion was felt. Subsequently, they 




                                                 




For each of the four emotions, Figure 5 presents the development of the mean intensity scores over 
the forty-eight hour waiting period. A clearly U-shaped pattern shows up, in line with the 
predictions based on Caplin and Leahy (2001). The U-shaped pattern is especially prominent for 
Excitement and Hope. We also note that for Excitement, Hope and Anxiety, the peak observed in 
the last two hours (that is, just before the resolution of risk) is more pronounced than the peak in the 
first two hours (right after the decision). Only in case of Excitement the difference is (marginally) 
significant (sign test, p = 0.068). Furthermore, in contrast with the predictions based on the affect 
models, Hope is not more pronounced in LP, while Anxiety is similar under both HP and LP. In 
combination with result P3 of the previous section, showing that the anticipated emotions scores do 
not reflect any greater buildup of anticipatory emotions in Del compared to Imm, we find only 
limited support for the existing affect models regarding the (anticipated) development of 
anticipatory emotions during the waiting period.  
  Finally, we can investigate whether the anticipatory emotions anticipated at the time of the 
investment decision are in line with the emotions subjects recalled they had experienced during the 
waiting period (in Del). We focus on the three emotions covered by both measures, that is, hope, 
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sum of all the forty-eight entries (scores) for each emotion. We find no significant correlation for 
any of the three anticipated-recalled emotion pairs. The same holds when we control for the 
probability condition and (by means of a regression) for the amount invested. Nor is it the case that 
anticipated emotions correlate with other equally valenced recalled emotions.  
All in all, these results suggest a misalignment between anticipated and experienced emotions 
under the delayed resolution of risk, and hint at the underestimation of future emotions as discussed 
in the previous subsection. To the extent that delayed resolution increases perceived uncertainty, 
this may be due to a dampening of emotional reactions (van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2006).  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Over the last decade some theoretical and experimental studies of decision-making under risk have 
suggested that agents may be affected by anticipatory emotions, which may induce a preference for 
the timing of the resolution of risk that is not allowed for in standard economic theory. So far, 
however, experimental studies have only referred to emotions without actually measuring them. 
Moreover, typically hypothetical choice problems have been used. In this study, we had 
participants put their own money at stake in a real investment task and explicitly measured affect. 
In addition, we measured in an incentive compatible way participants’ preferences for resolution 
timing, risk, and time, and collected via a web-based questionnaire data on affective traits and risk 
attitude in various life domains. 
As main behavioral result we found a substantial resolution timing effect, but only if the 
chance of losing the invested amount of money is small (HP). It turned out that our affect measures 
were important for explaining these outcomes. In line with most earlier experimental studies we 
find some (weak) support for a general attractiveness of early resolution. Furthermore, supportive 
of Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) seems to be the result that, under immediate resolution (that is, 
within the same session), participants find the negatively skewed mixed gamble (HP) much more 
attractive than the positively skewed one (LP). In contrast with LP, in HP the impact of negative 
anticipated (anticipatory) emotions is compensated by strong positive emotions. To our knowledge 
it is a novel further finding that under delayed resolution the reverse is observed with positive 
anticipated emotions now compensating the impact of the negative emotions in LP but not in HP. INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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Together these results explain why a significant resolution timing effect shows up in HP (with less 
investment under delayed resolution) but not in LP. 
The observed switch in the relative impact of positive versus negative anticipated emotions 
between the two timing conditions (in both HP and LP) cannot be explained by the theoretical 
affect models of Wu (1999) and Caplin and Leahy (2001). In particular, because, counter to the 
assumptions of these models, the intensity and general impact of anticipated emotions turned out to 
be weaker under delayed resolution. Although the Wu model has some relevance in linking positive 
(negative) anticipatory emotions to positively (negatively) skewed gambles, while Caplin and 
Leahy’s model correctly emphasizes the role of negative emotions, overall, we did not find much 
evidence in support of these models. 
Our results suggest that one should not focus too much on single emotions (like anxiety) but 
that both positive and negative anticipated emotions (related to anticipatory emotions as well as 
emotions experienced after the resolution of risk), should be taken into account. Moreover, the 
unexpected finding of a weaker, instead of stronger, role of affect under delayed resolution 
deserves further research. The data concerning recalled emotions support the hypothesis of a 
misalignment between anticipated and experienced emotions in case of a (substantially) delayed 
resolution of risk, with future emotions being underestimated. Whether this is related to a 
psychological effect, causing a dampening of emotions, is yet unclear. Also, it would be important 
to investigate to what extent our results are robust under repeated decision making. On the one 
hand, one can imagine that experience with the task at hand might make it less emotional. On the 
other hand, the experience of (sustained) losses or gains could easily fuel emotions or perhaps lead 
to moods with additional effects on decision making. 
Finally, we notice that the tendency to prefer early resolution and to assume less risk under 
delayed resolution if the probability of losing is small, may help understand several phenomena 
observed in the field. For example, it would partly explain why individuals are willing to pay so 
much for insurance policies, even when the maximal possible loss is small. Also, it may shed a new 
light on why people seem reluctant to take on investment risks (e.g. the equity premium puzzle). 
Our results suggest that this would particularly hold for cases where the chances of running losses 
are relatively small and the resolution of risk is distant in time. In comparison, the resolution of a 
lottery risk typically occurs only some days or weeks after the purchase of a ticket. Interestingly, 
and in line with our findings, gambling devices such as scratching cards ("instants") or roulette, INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
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which offer "on the spot" resolution and less-skewed prospects (better odds of winning and lower 
maximal returns), are much less popular than lotteries (Forrest et al., 2001). 
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Appendix A: Instructions (handouts; translated from Dutch) 
 
[The handouts presented below were used for the Low Probability, Delayed resolution treatment 
(LP-Del). Instructions for other treatments, which involve minimal necessary changes, are available 





You have brought 20 euro as working money to this experiment. You may earn extra money with it 
but you may also lose money. 
 
In today’s session you will have to make a single decision concerning your working money. This 
will be further explained below. You will be also asked to answer a number of questions.  
 
The decision that you must take concerns splitting your working money of 20 euro between two 
projects.  We will refer to these projects as project A and project B. The outcome of the projects 
will be decided at the beginning of the second session on _______ 
 
Your total earnings from both sessions will be transferred to your bank account on the next 
working day after the second session on ___, that is on _____. Please take into account the delay 
involved in such operations. To make the transfer possible, you will have to give us your bank 
details during the second session. 
 
Information about projects 
You will now have to make a single decision concerning your working money. You have to 
allocate your 20 euro over two projects. These projects will be labeled on the computer screen, 
when you make your decision, with the letters A and B. 
 
Project A: Investing in this project you will get 1.2 euro for every euro that you put into the 
project. Thus, project A always gives a certain return (namely 1.2 times the invested amount). 
 
Project B: For the amount that you put in project B the following holds. With probability one over 
five (20 percent chance) you will get 9 times the amount you put into the project and with 
probability four over five (80 percent chance) you will lose this amount.  
 
You can allocate your working money in multiples of 1 euro over the projects A and B in any 
possible combination that adds up to 20 euro. 
 
The table below shows for each possible combination that you can choose the earnings and 
corresponding probabilities. The net earnings are computed by subtracting 20 euro from the total 
earnings. All values are in euro.  
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When project B succeeds 
(20 percent chance) 
When project B fails  





Earnings (V)  Net earnings 
(V-20) 
Earnings (V)  Net earnings 
(V-20)  
20  0  24 4  24 4 
19 1  31.8 11.8 22.8 2.8 
18 2  39.6 19.6 21.6 1.6 
17 3  47.4 27.4 20.4 0.4 
16 4  55.2 35.2 19.2 -0.8 
15  5  63 43 18 -2 
14 6  70.8 50.8 16.8 -3.2 
13 7  78.6 58.6 15.6 -4.4 
12 8  86.4 66.4 14.4 -5.6 
11 9  94.2 74.2 13.2 -6.8 
10 10 102  82  12  -8 
9 11  109.8  89.8  10.8  -9.2 
8 12  117.6  97.6  9.6 -10.4 
7 13  125.4  105.4  8.4 -11.6 
6 14  133.2  113.2  7.2 -12.8 
5 15  141 121 6  -14 
4 16  148.8  128.8  4.8 -15.2 
3 17  156.6  136.6  3.6 -16.4 
2 18  164.4  144.4  2.4 -17.6 
1 19  172.2  152.2  1.2 -18.8 
0 20  180 160 0  -20 
 
The result of project B will be determined at the beginning of the second session on ___.  Each 
participant will receive two dice. Everyone will be asked to throw them once under supervision. 
Note that even if you have put nothing in project B, you will also have to throw the dice.  
 
One of the dice shows tens: 00, 10, 20 up to 90; the other shows units: 0, 1 up to 9. The sum of both 
numbers (where a combination of 00 and 0 represents 100) can be any number between 1 and 100 
with equal probability.  
 
If the sum is 20 or less (20 percent chance), you will receive 9 times the amount put in project B. If 
the sum is 21 or more (80 percent chance), you will lose the money put in project B.  
 
Your total earnings will be equal to the earnings from project B plus earnings from project A (the 
latter being equal to 1.2 times the amount in project A). If you have a question, please raise your 
hand. We will then come to your desk to assist you. 
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Handout 2 (LP, Delayed) 
 
In this part of the experiment you will have to make a number of choices. The table in this handout 
serves as an illustration of how the choices will look like on the screen. It will always be a choice 
between the option to determine the outcome of project B today (we call it Option NOW) and the 
option to let it happen in two days (Option LATER). The probability of success for project B will 
always be 20 percent for option LATER (this chance is identical to the one you have faced when 
you were splitting your working money), so you can always choose to stay in the situation as it was 
when you were making your decision. In contrast, the probability of success in project B will vary 




Whatever you choose, the amount that you put in project B will remain unchanged and so will the 
time when the earnings will be transferred to your bank account.  
 
Please note: in order to collect your earnings, you will have to be present for both sessions. There 
will also be new opportunities to win money during the second session.  
 
One of your choices between NOW and LATER will be randomly selected and implemented (that 
is to say, really played out with the corresponding probability of success in project B). Make thus 
your choices carefully.  
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We will now explain in greater detail the choices you will be making. For this, please look at the 
table above.  
 
You see that 11 choices have to be made. In each case you have to choose between option NOW 
and option LATER. As mentioned before, under option NOW you will learn the results of project B 
during the today’s session, whereas under option LATER you will learn it during the session in two 
days. The table also shows the probabilities of success for project B. This chance is always 20 
percent for option LATER but varies for option NOW. 
 
Please remember that one of your choices will be randomly selected to be played out for real. 
 
For an example, look at the second decision problem (in the second row of the table). If you choose 
for option NOW, project B will succeed with probability 10 percent and whether it does in fact 
succeed or not will be determined during this session. If you, on the other hand, go for option 
LATER, the probability of success in project B will be equal to 20 percent and you will learn the 
outcome of this project during the second session in two days.  
 
The other choices are similar, except for the fact that the probability of success in project B under 
option NOW increases as you go down the table. 
 
For every choice problem you are asked to choose between options NOW and LATER by clicking 
on the buttons on the right side of the table (NOW or LATER). If you do not have any preference, 
such that you cannot decide which option should be selected, please click on "I" (for "Indifferent").  
 
You can thus choose NOW in some of the rows, choose LATER in other rows and have no 
preference (choose I) in still other rows. You can change your choices and make them in any order 
you want.  
 
Note that as you go down the rows of the table, the probability of success in project B always 
increases by 10 percentage points. It can happen that we want to know more precisely about your 
preference between options NOW and LATER. In such a case, you will see a new table with some 
more choices of the same sort.  
 
When you are done with your choices, one of them will be randomly selected and played out for 
real. If you want to know precisely how this will happen, read the following. Otherwise, go to the  
Summary. 
The computer will randomly draw a number between 1 and 100 to determine the chance of success 
(in percentage points) for project B under option NOW. If you made a choice for this particular 
percentage, it will be implemented. Otherwise, we will make us of your choices between NOW and 
LATER for probabilities that are just above and just below the selected number. By doing so we 
will assume that: you prefer option NOW if in both of these two problems you have picked NOW 
or if you have picked NOW in one of them and I in the other; you prefer option LATER if in both 
of these problems you have picked LATER or if you have picked LATER in one of them and I in 
the other; you are indifferent if you have chosen I in both of these decision problems.  




In each row of the table you have to choose whether you prefer option NOW, option LATER or 
whether you are indifferent (I), taking into account the corresponding time when the result of 
project B is revealed and the appropriate probability of success.  
You can choose NOW for some rows, LATER for other rows and I for still others. You can change 
your choices and make them in any order you want.  
When everyone is ready, the computer will randomly select one of the choices for implementation. 
In case you do not have a preference for the selected decision problem, one of the options will be 
chosen randomly.  
 
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come to your table to assist you.  




   
In this part of the experiment you will have to make a number of choices. What you have to do is 
quite similar to the choices between options NOW and LATER that you have been making during 
the previous session, however this time the options are different. In total you will have to fill out 
four lists of ten choices between an option X and an option Y. One of these choices will be 
randomly selected to be paid out to you.  
 
We will now explain to you the choices you have to make. 
For an example, look at the lists in this handout. 
 




It shows ten decisions. Each decision is a choice between "Option X" and "Option Y". Both options 
give with some probability a high outcome and with some probability a low outcome. We will 
explain these options later on. 
 
You will have to choose one of the two options by clicking on the button X or Y on the right. For 
some decisions you may not care whether you receive Option X or Y, in which case you should 
click the button labeled "I" for "Indifference".  
 
You will have to fill out four such decision sheets and make ten choices on each of them. But only 
one of the choices will be used in the end to determine your earnings. Because each decision is 
equally likely to be selected and played out for real, it is important that you make your decisions 
carefully.  
 
We will now explain the options on the decision sheet. For an example, please look at the first 
choice in the first row.  
 
If you choose Option X you will get 8.00 euro with probability one in ten (10 percent chance) and 
6.40 euro with probability nine in ten (90 percent chance), if this row is selected for real payments. 
To determine the outcome we will roll a ten-sided dice with numbers from 1 to 10 (0 stands for 10). 
If the dice shows the number 1 then you will earn 8.00 euro. If the dice shows any other number 
then you will receive 6.40 euro. Since there are nine numbers other than 1 on the dice, there is a 
probability of 90 percent (nine in ten) that you receive 6.40 euro and 10 percent (one in ten) that 
you earn 8.00 euro. 
 
Similarly, option Y yields 15.40 euro with probability 10 percent and 0.40 euro with probability 90 
percent.  
 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher 
payoff for each option increases. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, no dice roll will be 
needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure. So you actually have here a choice 
between 8.00 and 15.40 euro.  
 
When everybody has made his decisions, we will ask one participant to roll a die four times: first a 
four-sided die to decide which list (1, 2, 3 or 4) is selected, next a ten-sided die to decide which of 
the ten choices is selected, then a die to select X or Y for those who are indifferent in this decision 
problem, and finally a ten-sided die to determine the outcome of options X and Y (only the option 
that you have selected will apply to you). Note that all dice rolls will apply equally to all 
participants. 
Summary 
You will make ten choices on each of four lists. For each decision row you will have to choose 
whether you prefer Option X or Option Y.  
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You may for example choose X for some decision rows and Y for other rows, you may also be 
indifferent between the options X and Y and pick I for still other rows. You may change your 
decisions and make them in any order.  
 
When you are finished, one decision will be picked as described and your earnings for this choice 
will be added to your previous earnings.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your desk to assist you.  
 





In this part of the experiment you will have to make 17 choices between option YELLOW and 
option BLUE. One of these choices will be randomly selected to be paid out to you.  
 




The table shows seventeen decisions. Each decision is a choice between option YELLOW and 
option BLUE: 
 INVESTMENT, RESOLUTION OF RISK, AND THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
43 
 
•  with option YELLOW your earnings will be transferred tomorrow  
•  with option BLUE, a higher amount will be transferred in two months time.  
 
You will have to choose one of the two options by clicking button YELLOW or BLUE on the right. 
For some decisions you may not care whether you receive Option YELLOW or BLUE, in which 
case you should click the button labeled "I" for "Indifference".  
 
You will have to make seventeen choices but only one of the choices will be used in the end to 
determine your earnings. Because each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end, it is 
important that you make each choice carefully. 
 
We will now explain the options on the decision sheet. For an example, please look at the first 
choice in the first row. Option YELLOW always means that your earnings from the experiment 
will be transferred to you tomorrow. When you are making your choices, this column thus always 
shows your earnings from previous parts. In this example this is 41.60 euro. Option BLUE means 
in this example that 41.74 euros will be transferred to you in two months. Note that this amount is 
0.33 percent higher than the amount paid by option YELLOW. This corresponds to a nominal 
annual rate of 2 percent, as indicated in the fourth column.  
 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the amount that option 
BLUE pays increases.  
 
When everybody has made his decision, we will ask a participant to roll a die twice: first to select 
one of the 17 choices and then, for those who selected I (Indifferent) in this row, to select option 
YELLOW or BLUE. The outcomes of the rolling of the dice will apply to all participants. 
Summary 
You will make seventeen choices. For each decision row you will have to choose whether you 
prefer Option YELLOW or Option BLUE.  
 
You may for example choose YELLOW for some decision rows and BLUE for other rows, you 
may also be indifferent between the options YELLOW and BLUE for still other rows. You may 
change your decisions and make them in any order. When you are finished, one of the seventeen 
decision rows will be selected randomly as described before and the option you have chosen in this 
row will be implemented.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. We will then come to your desk to assist you. 
Otherwise, you can start with the choices in the table that will appear on the screens.  
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Appendix B. Questionnaires 
 
B. 1. Risk propensity scale (Nicholson et al., 2005) 
Note: One question about career risk was skipped, since it was considered irrelevant for 
undergraduate students. Question 06 is based on Dohmen et al. (2005). 
 
 
Below you find a number of statements, that people use to describe themselves. Read each of them 
and rank them on a scale from 1 to 5. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not think for too 
long but choose according to your first impression.   
 
[answer on scale from 1=never  to 5=very often ] 
 
01. In my adult life I have taken recreational risks (e.g. rock-climbing, scuba diving) 
02. In my adult life I have taken health risks (e.g. smoking, poor diet, high alcohol consumption) 
03. In my adult life I have taken financial risks (e.g. gambling, risky investments) 
04. In my adult life I have taken safety risks (e.g. fast driving, city cycling on a bike with poor 
brakes, riding a car without a seat belt on) 
05. In my adult life I have taken social risks (e.g. standing for election, publicly challenging a rule 
or decision) 
 
[answer on scale from 1=not at all  to 5=very much so] 
 
06. Taken all things together, I am very willing to take risk. 
 
B. 2. Trait anxiety (STAI ; Spielberger et al., 1970 ) 
 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement and then choose the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you 
generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers.  
Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe 
how you generally feel. 
 
[answer on scale from 1="almost never" to 4="almost always"] 
 
07. I feel pleasant 
08. I tire quickly 
09. I feel like crying 
10. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be 
11. I am losing out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough 
12. I feel rested 
13. I am "calm, cool and collected" 
14. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them 
15. I worry too much over something that really doesn't matter 
16. I am happy 
17. I am inclined to take things hard 
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19. I feel secure 
20. I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty 
21. I feel blue 
22. I am content 
23. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me 
24. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my mind 
25. I am a steady person 
26. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests 
 
 
Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20 and 80, representing the anxiety trait of 
the subject [ANXIETY-trait]. 
 
B. 3. Sensation seeking (Arnett, 1993) 
 
Below you find a number of statements, that people use to describe themselves. Read each of them 
and rank them on a scale from 1 to 4, indicating whether or not they describe you correctly. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Do not think for too long but choose according to your first 
impression.   
 
[answer on scale from 1="does not describe me at all" to 4="describes me very well"] 
 
27. I can see how it would be interesting to marry someone from a foreign country. 
28. When the water is very cold, I prefer not to swim even if it is a hot day.  
29. If I have to wait in a long line, I’m usually patient about it.  
30. When I listen to music, I like it to be loud. 
31. When taking a trip, I think it is best to make as few plans as possible and just take it as it comes 
32. I stay away from movies that are said to be frightening or highly suspenseful.  
33. I think it’s fun and exciting to perform or speak before a group. 
34. If I were to go to an amusement park, I would prefer to ride the rollercoaster or other fast rides. 
35. I would like to travel to places that are strange and far away. 
36. I would never like to gamble with money, even if I could afford it.  
37. I would have enjoyed being one of the first explorers of an unknown land. 
38. I like a movie where there are a lot of explosions and car chases. 
39. I don’t like extremely hot and spicy foods.  
40. In general, I work better when I’m under pressure. 
41. I often like to have the radio or TV on while I’m doing something else, such as reading or 
cleaning up. 
42. It would be interesting to see a car accident happen. 
43. I think it’s best to order something familiar when eating in a restaurant.  
44. I like the feeling of standing next to the edge on a high place and looking down. 
45. If it were possible to visit another planet or the moon for free, I would be among the first in line 
to sign up 
46. I can see how it must be exciting to be in a battle during a war. 
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Appendix C. Declaration of consent 
Declaration 
I hereby declare my participation in 2 sessions of the experiment on ___ and ___, 2006. I 
acknowledge that, depending on my choices, I can lose up to 20 euro in the experiment. I am also 
aware that I will lose this amount if I do not participate in both sessions without a valid reason (e.g. 
a sick note). I realize that my earnings from the experiment will be transferred to my bank account 
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